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RESPONSE

JUSTICE KENNEDY TO THE RESCUE?

LUIS FUENTES-ROHWER

†

In response to Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of
Biased Votes, Unconstitutional Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U.
PA . L. R EV. 377 (2012).
1

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is a doctrinal mess. Through a
totality of circumstances inquiry, Section 2 has evolved from its modest
beginnings as a codification of the Fifteenth Amendment into a “mys2
terious judicial inquiry” that places the Supreme Court in the enviable position of policing the contours of the politics of race. This is a
role that the Justices have played to mixed reviews. The criticisms are
well known: not only does the doctrine offer little guidance to the
3
lower courts, but it also promotes the creation of majority-minority
districts, a mode of racial policymaking that is said to be inconsistent
4
with our commitment to racial equality. These two criticisms make
clear that Section 2 is vulnerable to constitutional attack.
†

Professor of Law and Harry T. Ice Faculty Fellow, Maurer School of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington.
1
See Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1973 – 1973bb-1 (2006)).
2
Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes, Unconstitutional Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. PA . L. R EV. 377, 381 (2012).
3
See A BIGAIL T HERNSTROM , V OTING R IGHTS — AND W RONGS : T HE E LUSIVE
Q UEST FOR R ACIALLY FAIR E LECTIONS 206 (2009) (arguing that the Court will have
to resolve questions of race and representation surrounding Section 2).
4
See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (rejecting a reapportionment plan because it gave the misleading “perception that members of the same racial group . . . think
alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls”).

(209)
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Professor Elmendorf’s article is a welcome response to this state of
affairs. He offers an understanding of Section 2 “as a delegation of
authority to the courts to develop a common law of racially fair elections, guided by certain substantive and evidentiary norms, as well as
5
norms about legal change.” This is a thoughtful and intriguing proposal. It also finds much support from the historical record in at least
three respects. First, a call to delegate authority to the courts is precisely the approach Congress took when it chose to enforce the Fifteenth
6
Amendment through the Voting Rights Act. This argument need only
recognize two obvious points: that Congress wished to enforce the
amendment to its constitutional limits, and that Congress could not be
sure where these limits were. What we see in response is a statute drafted in general terms, which was essentially an invitation to the Court to
7
extend the law as far as constitutionally permissible. The language also
8
allowed the Justices to adapt the law to changing circumstances.
Second, conceptualizing Section 2 as a common law statute makes
sense of the Court’s voting rights jurisprudence. This is how the
Court has interpreted the Voting Rights Act—and Section 2 in partic-

5

Elmendorf, supra note 2, at 383.
See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Understanding the Paradoxical Case of the Voting Rights Act,
36 F LA . S T. U. L. R EV . 697, 729 (2009) (arguing that Congress wanted to “shift the
constitutional inquiry . . . to the Attorney General or the district court” to speed up
changes in the law and shift the burden of proof to the states).
7
See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566-67 (1969) (“Indicative of an
intention to give the Act the broadest possible scope, Congress expanded the language
in the final version of § 2 . . . .”); see also Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder
(NAMUDNO), 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2514 (2009) (explaining that “specific precedent, the
structure of the Voting Rights Act, and underlying constitutional concerns compel a
broader reading of the bailout provision” under Section 4(a) of the Act);
NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2524 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“[B]ecause it sweeps more broadly than the substantive command of the Fifteenth Amendment, § 5 pushes the outer boundaries of Congress’ Fifteenth
Amendment enforcement authority.”).
8
See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 480 (2003) (reinterpreting § 5’s retrogression inquiry as a totality of circumstances test); Dougherty Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. White,
439 U.S. 32, 47 (1978) (applying § 5 to a county school board’s internal policy regarding employees running for public office); United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S.
110, 117-18 (1978) (applying § 5 to all political units, not just those listed in
§ 14(c)(2)); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 531 (1973) (applying § 5 to apportionment); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 387-95 (1971) (applying § 5 to
changes in polling places and boundary lines, as well as to the shift from ward-based
voting to at-large elections).
6
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9

ular—for much of its history. Finally, the substantive norms at the
heart of Elmendorf’s proposal date back to arguments made in the
early years of the Act. Under his proposal, a dilution injury is one
where “race-biased decisionmaking . . . results in minorities having less
10
representational opportunity than they otherwise would.” A “racebiased decision” is a decision that “would have been different had the
11
race of persons considered by the decisionmaker been different.” A
participation injury arises when race-biased decisions lead to “dispar12
ate burdens on minority participation.” Similar arguments were
pressed by former Attorney General Katzenbach during the 1975 Sen13
ate hearings and by lower courts in the early years of the Act.
That said, I part company with Professor Elmendorf, if modestly so,
in one crucial respect. His proposal requires much greater faith in
the conservative Justices on the Court than the existing evidence allows me to endorse. As an attitudinal question, these Justices have
made clear that they are not fans of race-conscious policymaking in
general and of Section 2 in particular. Chief Justice Roberts, for example, in an opinion joined by Justice Alito, writes that the creation of
majority-minority districts is a “sordid business, this divvying us up by
14
race.” Justice Thomas argues that these districts “exacerbate racial
15
tensions,” and explains, more generally, that “[w]e would be mighty
Platonic guardians indeed if Congress had granted us the authority to
determine the best form of local government for every county, city,
16
village, and town in America.” Justice Scalia agrees that the jurisprudence in this area “continues to drift ever further from the Act’s pur-

9

For a general discussion of the Court’s interpretation of Section 2, see Guy-Uriel E.
Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The VRA in Winter: The Death of a Superstatute (2012)
(unpublished manuscript) (draft on file with author).
10
Elmendorf, supra note 2, at 383-84.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
See Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearings on S. 407, S. 903, S. 1297, S.
1409, and S. 1443 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 125 (1975) (statement of Nicholas Katzenbach, former Att’y Gen. of
the United States) (“While blacks have made important gains, these gains do not reflect
the political power of their numbers were there no discrimination.”); see also Beer v.
United States, 374 F. Supp. 363, 389-90 (D.D.C. 1974) (explaining that “the question
before us is not whether New Orleans must confer upon its black citizens every political
advantage that a redistricting plan conceivably could offer,” and suggesting that plaintiffs
should “press vigorously . . . for all that is their due, but . . . no more”).
14
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 511 (2006)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
15
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 907 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
16
Id. at 913.
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17

pose of ensuring minority voters equal electoral opportunities.”
These four Justices are poised to strike down the Act on constitutional
18
grounds.
Professor Elmendorf recognizes this problem. He responds that
his proposed standard “should allay the concerns of critics like Justice
Thomas, who assert that insofar as Section 2 reaches anything beyond
barriers to casting a valid, duly counted ballot, nothing will limit it ex19
cept the ‘political imagination’ of judges.” Elmendorf reads this passage to suggest that Justice Thomas objects to Section 2 because of its
lack of limits on judges.
I read these Justices differently. They seem to be concerned not
with the lack of a limiting principle for Section 2, but with the fact that
Section 2 is too race-conscious for their taste. Their particular concern
is a matter of policy and not necessarily legal interpretation. Through
their interpretations of the Voting Rights Act, Justices Scalia and Thomas have made clear that they will go to any lengths in order to see their
policy preferences reflected in law, irrespective of the will of Congress
or established precedent. As I argue elsewhere, their interpretations of
20
the Act can only be described as “judicial activism on steroids.”
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Reno v. Bossier Parish School
21
Board (Bossier Parish II) encapsulates his interpretive approach. This
is a case where Justice Scalia showcases his considerable abilities as
22
both jurist and sophist. Conclusion in hand, he easily casts aside
contrary precedents as “nothing more than an ex necessitate limitation
23
upon the effect prong in the particular context of annexation,” or by
24
explaining that the case “involved an unusual fact pattern,” or by not-

17

LULAC, 548 U.S. at 512 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Future of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in the Hands
of a Conservative Court, 5 D UKE J. C ONST. L. & P UB . P OL’ Y 125, 127 (2010) (“Five Justices have strong reservations about the constitutionality . . . of [S]ection 2 . . . .
Whether the Court ultimately strikes down [Section 2] is a question only Justice
Kennedy can answer.”).
19
Elmendorf, supra note 2, at 383 n.26 (quoting Holder, 512 U.S. at 911
(Thomas, J., concurring)).
20
Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 6, at 751.
21
528 U.S. 320 (2000).
22
See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 6, at 739 (describing the opinion as a “lawyerly
brief, full of technical arguments and distinguished cases”).
23
Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 330 (referring to City of Richmond v. United
States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975)).
24
Id. at 339 (referring to City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462 (1987)).
18
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25

ing that unsupportive language was “pure dictum.” Needless to say,
the intent of Congress plays no part in the Court’s decision. Curiously, however, neither does the language of the statute. This is an atti26
tudinal tour de force. The opinion brings to mind criticism penned
by Justice Scalia himself about judging and the “Living Constitution”:
The starting point of the analysis will be Supreme Court cases, and the
new issue will presumptively be decided according to the logic that those
cases expressed, with no regard for how far that logic, thus extended, has
distanced us from the original text and understanding. Worse still, however, it is known and understood that if that logic fails to produce what in
the view of the current Supreme Court is the desirable result for the case
at hand, then, like good common-law judges, the Court will distinguish its
precedents, or narrow them, or if all else fails overrule them, in order that
27
the Constitution might mean what it ought to mean.

This passage accurately describes the Court’s opinion in Bossier Parish II.
Justice Thomas is similarly creative. In his concurring opinion in
Holder v. Hall, he challenges the existing orthodoxy, which places the
28
Supreme Court in charge of questions of political representation. As
an abstract question of political theory, Justice Thomas makes a powerful point; redistricting questions in general and the concept of
vote dilution in particular ask courts “‘to choose among competing
bases of representation—ultimately, really, among competing theo29
ries of political philosophy.’” As a question of law, however, his
opinion is terribly unpersuasive.
To begin, Justice Thomas’s opinion candidly admits to the role played
by his personal politics and policy preferences. The Justice can hardly
conceal his contempt for the use of race by the state. As he argues,
in resolving vote dilution actions we have given credence to the view that
race defines political interest. We have acted on the implicit assumption
that members of racial and ethnic groups must all think alike on important matters of public policy and must have their own “minority pre25

Id. at 338 (referring to a statement regarding apportionment from Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976)).
26
For a description of the attitudinal model, which argues that “the Supreme Court
decides disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and
values of the justices,” see J EFFREY A. S EGAL & H AROLD J. S PAETH , T HE S UPREME
C OURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL M ODEL R EVISITED 86 (2002).
27
A NTONIN S CALIA , A M ATTER OF I NTERPRETATION : F EDERAL C OURTS AND
THE L AW 39 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
28
512 U.S. 874, 891 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
29
Id. at 897 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)); see also id. at 894 (“Vote dilution cases have required the federal courts to
make decisions based on highly political judgments—judgments that courts are inherently ill-equipped to make.”).
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ferred” representatives holding seats in elected bodies if they are to be con30
sidered represented at all.

Consequently, he writes that “few devices could be better designed to exacerbate racial tensions than the consciously segregated
districting system currently being constructed in the name of the
31
Voting Rights Act.”
For evidence that his attitudes about race are driving the analysis,
note that his argument about political theory as applied to the Voting
Rights Act applies with equal if not stronger force to the law of democracy writ large. If the argument is one of political theory and the
immersion of federal courts into an area where contested and irresolvable political questions abound, then his work is only beginning.
He must be prepared to overturn fifty years of election law while returning the Court to the days before Baker v. Carr. But twenty years
after Holder, he has yet to take up this cause.
Only after demonstrating his displeasure with the use of race in
this context does Justice Thomas turn to law, and specifically to the
plain meaning of the statute. He offers a reading of Section 2’s language that returns the jurisprudence to the early days of the Act, up to
1969. From his perspective, the post-1969 jurisprudence is where eve32
rything went wrong, starting with Allen v. State Board of Elections. As
his many citations to Justice Harlan’s dissent in Allen attest, this is not
33
a new fight. It is also true that much precedent stands in his way.
This is precedent that, incidentally, has been ratified by Congress numerous times. Yet these earlier cases, not to mention the historical
record, prove no match to Justice Thomas’s ingenuity, just like Justice
Scalia’s in Bossier Parish II. In this case, as in many others, he is clearly
34
and unquestionably a “single-minded seeker[] of legal policy.”
The question for the future is whether Justices Scalia and Thomas
will eventually move the Court’s conservative wing toward their preferred position. This is particularly pertinent as applied to Justice
30

Id. at 903.
Id. at 907; see also id. at 905 (“We have involved the federal courts, and indeed the
Nation, in the enterprise of systematically dividing the country into electoral districts
along racial lines—an enterprise of segregating the races into political homelands that
amounts, in truth, to nothing short of a system of ‘political apartheid.’” (quoting Shaw
v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1994))).
32
393 U.S. 544 (1969).
33
See Holder, 512 U.S. at 896, 898-99, 919-20, 922, 930, 935.
34
Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making,
86 A M . P OL . S CI . R EV . 323, 325 (1992).
31
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Thomas, who in recent years has seen his influence on the Court
grow to the point that many of his positions that were once consid35
ered radical now command a majority of Justices. If Justice Thomas
had his way, then the Voting Rights Act—a superstatute in its own
36
right —will be domesticated and rendered an ordinary statute
through judicial interpretation or, more extremely, will be struck
down on constitutional grounds.
But on this question, as with many others, the final word rests with
37
Justice Kennedy, the Court’s resident super median. Almost twenty
years ago, Justice Kennedy argued that racial districts hinge on “offensive and demeaning assumption[s]” about minority voters and lead to
38
racial stereotyping. This was the essentialist critique that was a staple
of conservative jurisprudence in the 1990s. It fit comfortably with the
general colorblind critique of race-conscious measures. Justice Kennedy expressed these views as late as 2003, in his dissent in Grutter v.
39
Bollinger. Four years later, however, Justice Kennedy’s views began to
40
shift. The case was League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry
41
(LULAC). This change reflected a far more accommodating view on
questions of race than Justice Kennedy had expressed throughout his

35

See Jeffrey Toobin, Partners, NEW YORKER, Aug. 29, 2011, at 41 (“Since the arrival of Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., in 2005, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., in
2006, the Court has moved to the right when it comes to the free-speech rights of
corporations, the rights of gun owners, and, potentially, the powers of the federal
government; in each of these areas, the majority has followed where Thomas has
been leading for a decade or more. Rarely has a Supreme Court Justice enjoyed
such broad or significant vindication.”).
36
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE
NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 76 (2010) (describing how the civil rights movement led
to an “electoral transformation . . . through federal superstatutes”); Guy-Uriel E. Charles &
Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Superstatutory Interpretation (2012) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author) (arguing that the VRA is a superstatute and has been understood
and interpreted by the Supreme Court as such throughout its history).
37
See Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 S TAN . L. R EV . 37, 43 (2008)
(describing Justice Kennedy as a super median Justice due to his ability to “extract
considerable deference and exert inordinate influence on the Court”).
38
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911-12 (1995).
39
See 539 U.S. 306, 394 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“If universities are given
the latitude to administer programs that are tantamount to quotas, they will have few
incentives to make the existing minority admissions schemes transparent and protective of individual review. The unhappy consequence will be to perpetuate the hostilities that proper consideration of race is designed to avoid. The perpetuation, of
course, would be the worst of all outcomes.”).
40
See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Is this the End of the Second Reconstruction? 13 (Ind. Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 197, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1954684.
41
548 U.S. 399 (2006).
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42

career on the bench. Two years later, in his controlling concurring
opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
43
No. 1 (Parents Involved), Justice Kennedy spelled out his changing
views. He no longer subscribed to “an all-too-unyielding insistence
that race cannot be a factor,” nor did he agree with the plurality’s
“dismissive[ness] of the legitimate interest government has in ensur44
ing all people have equal opportunity regardless of their race.” Justice Kennedy even took on Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,
45
an iconic statement of faith in conservative circles. According to
46
Kennedy, Harlan’s axiom that “[o]ur constitution is color-blind” is
nothing more than an “aspiration,” and as such, it “must command
47
our assent.” This is where most arguments end, but not Justice Kennedy’s. For as he explained, “In the real world, it is regrettable to say,
48
it cannot be a universal constitutional principle.” The shift in Ken49
nedy’s jurisprudence is nothing short of “striking.”
This shift is the reason why this Response ends on a hopeful note.
Professor Elemndorf’s approach seems tailor-made for Justice Kennedy. Though I am skeptical that Justices Scalia and Thomas would
grapple seriously with the content of a common law approach to policymaking in the context of voting rights, Justice Kennedy has shown
that he is willing to engage. It is less than clear that the Court’s conservative wing is interested in giving these questions the care they deserve. Rather, slogans and ideology tend to replace thoughtful en50
engagement with these difficult issues.
Without a doubt, the questions raised by the Voting Rights Act
are serious questions of policy and constitutional law. They demand
serious answers. Professor Elmendorf’s rich and thoughtful argument has provided an important framework that promises to move
us forward. But this is why the efficacy, and ultimately the constitu42

Id. at 435 (rejecting a state redistricting plan because it divided a particular Latino district as a result of the district having “found an efficacious political identity”).
43
551 U.S. 701 (2007).
44
Id. at 787-88.
45
163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896).
46
Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
47
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788.
48
Id.
49
Heather K. Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal Protection, 121 H ARV.
L. R EV . 104, 109 (2007).
50
How else to understand the Chief Justice’s statement that the “way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race?” Parents
Involved, 551 U.S. at 748.
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tionality, of the Voting Rights Act, hangs in the balance. The ball is
in Justice Kennedy’s court.

Preferred Citation: Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Response, Justice Kennedy to
the Rescue?, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 209 (2011), http://www.
pennumbra.com/responses/1-2012/FuentesRohwer.pdf.

